Deep Switch is currently shipping v0.1.x. Security fixes will be backported to the latest minor release in the 0.1.x series. Earlier minors and the 0.0.x pre-releases are not maintained.

Please open a private security advisory at https://github.com/skyedolyn-sys/deep-switch/security/advisories/new before disclosing publicly.

GitHub's private advisory channel is preferred — it keeps the report visible only to maintainers until disclosure. If you cannot use GitHub advisories, open a regular issue marked @security and we will convert it to a private advisory on receipt.

When reporting, please include:

• A clear description of the issue and its impact
• Steps to reproduce, or a proof-of-concept
• The commit hash or release tag where you observed it
• Any known workarounds

We aim to send an initial response within 72 hours of receiving a report. After that we will coordinate timeline, scope, and disclosure format with you.

Deep Switch is a small, single-purpose Electron application. The threat model below describes exactly what it does, what it touches, and what stays untouched.

• Reads and writes ~/.deepcode/settings.json under the current user's home directory. This is the file consumed by the Deep Code CLI. Access is mediated by Electron's main process — the renderer never touches the filesystem directly.
• Stores provider records (display name, base URL, model ID, API key, thinking/effort toggles) in ~/.deep-switch/config.json as plain JSON on the current user's machine. See the security caveat in the next section.
• Calls the provider's /v1/models endpoint with the API key only when the user clicks "Fetch models" or activates a provider. This is the only outbound network call the app makes. The user can also trigger a one-shot connection test which sends a minimal ping chat request against the configured model.
• Persists UI preferences (preferredLanguage, last selected provider) in the same ~/.deep-switch/config.json file.

• No telemetry. No analytics SDKs, no usage beacons, no crash reporters.
• No automatic uploads. The app never opens an outgoing connection on its own; it only responds to explicit user actions.
• No remote logging. Errors are written to the local stderr / console only and never forwarded.
• No credentials sent to third parties. The only endpoint an API key is ever sent to is the provider base URL the user has configured for the matching provider. There is no analytics CDN, no error-reporting endpoint, no auto-update check that includes credentials.
• No remote dependency loading. No runtime fetches of JavaScript or stylesheets from third-party origins.

In the v0.1.x line, ~/.deep-switch/config.json is stored as plain JSON, NOT encrypted at rest. API keys sit alongside your other user files with the standard permissions of your home directory.

This means:

• Anyone with read access to your user account on the machine can read the file.
• Backups, sync tools, or filesystem snapshots (Time Machine, cloud drive sync, etc.) will capture the keys as part of any other file in ~.

What we are shipping to fix this in v0.2: OS-level encryption of the API key field via Electron's safeStorage API. The key material will be wrapped under a platform-protected key (Keychain on macOS, DPAPI on Windows, Secret Service / libsecret on Linux). Non-secret fields (name, base URL, model) will continue to live in the JSON file as before. v0.2 also introduces a configurable config-path override so the encrypted file does not have to live under ~/.deep-switch/ if you prefer a different location.

Until v0.2:

• Restrict access to your home directory to the level you are comfortable with.
• If you stop using a provider, delete its record (the App's delete button removes the entire record, including the API key).
• Don't share machines or sync ~/.deep-switch/ to cloud storage you don't trust with your other credentials.

The following are not vulnerabilities in Deep Switch and should be reported to the relevant maintainers instead:

• Vulnerabilities in the Deep Code CLI itself (it is a separate project; the settings.json schema, command-line behaviour, etc. are theirs to fix).
• Vulnerabilities in upstream provider APIs (DeepSeek, OpenAI, Anthropic, Moonshot, etc.) — contact each provider through their security disclosure process.
• Vulnerabilities in Electron, Node.js, or Chromium that Deep Switch benefits from automatically when those projects ship a fix.

• 90 days is our default coordinated-disclosure window. Critical issues may move faster; less impactful issues may move slower if a fix is in flight.
• We follow coordinated disclosure: we will not publicly disclose a report until a fix is available, or 90 days have elapsed, whichever comes first — unless you request otherwise in writing.
• We may credit reporters in release notes (and in the Credits section below) unless you ask to remain anonymous.

Thank you to the security community. We will list reporters who consent to attribution here as advisories are resolved.

• None yet — be the first.

• Email: security@deepswitch.app (placeholder; see "Reporting a Vulnerability" above)
• Repository issues: do not file vulnerability reports through public GitHub issues.