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fix(security): bound URL component response size to prevent memory exhaustion - #15436
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WalkthroughThe URL component now streams responses under per-response and per-fetch byte limits. It restricts content encodings, follows redirects manually with a hop cap, and stops crawling when the shared budget is exhausted. The updated implementation is included in starter projects and the component registry. ChangesURL Fetching
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant URLComponent
participant HTTPClient
participant SSRFValidator
URLComponent->>HTTPClient: Stream a bounded request
HTTPClient-->>URLComponent: Return response or redirect
URLComponent->>SSRFValidator: Validate redirect target when SSRF protection is enabled
SSRFValidator-->>URLComponent: Return validated target
URLComponent->>HTTPClient: Follow redirect within the hop limit
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✅ Passed checks (8 passed)
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## release-1.13.0 #15436 +/- ##
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Review comments at
@src/backend/tests/unit/components/data_source/test_url_component.py:
- Around line 367-372: Update `_read_bounded_text()` to consume the raw response
stream and decompress incrementally with an output cap based on the remaining
byte budget, rejecting oversized decoded data before appending it to `body`.
Extend `test_limit_applies_to_decoded_size()` with a regression assertion that
verifies decoded output never exceeds that budget before storage.
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📒 Files selected for processing (9)
src/backend/base/langflow/initial_setup/starter_projects/Blog Writer.jsonsrc/backend/base/langflow/initial_setup/starter_projects/Custom Component Generator.jsonsrc/backend/base/langflow/initial_setup/starter_projects/Price Deal Finder.jsonsrc/backend/base/langflow/initial_setup/starter_projects/Simple Agent.jsonsrc/backend/base/langflow/initial_setup/starter_projects/Social Media Agent.jsonsrc/backend/base/langflow/initial_setup/starter_projects/Travel Planning Agents.jsonsrc/backend/tests/unit/components/data_source/test_url_component.pysrc/lfx/src/lfx/_assets/component_index.jsonsrc/lfx/src/lfx/components/data_source/url.py
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…haustion The URL component buffered every HTTP response body in full (client.get + response.text) with no size limit, so a URL serving a huge or endless body -- reachable from chat input when the component is an Agent tool -- could exhaust the Langflow process's memory (GHSA-qvqp-mxh4-f27w). - Stream responses and stop reading once a body exceeds MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES (10 MiB), rejecting early on an oversized Content-Length. - Share a MAX_TOTAL_BYTES (100 MiB) budget across every URL and crawled page of one fetch; the crawl stops once it is spent. - Never read redirect bodies: the pinned per-hop loop streams each hop, and the unpinned path follows httpx's own next_request instead of auto-follow, which reads every redirect body into memory (same cookies, headers and cap). - Advertise and accept only gzip/deflate; brotli, zstd and stacked codings can expand a few hundred bytes into gigabytes inside one decode call.
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Pushed bfa82b7 to close the remaining decompression bypass and merged the latest release-1.13.0 in 0d9d55e, resolving the component-index conflict. The reader now bounds raw input and zlib output before storing it, rejects incomplete streams and trailing data, and conservatively charges decoder errors against the shared budget. Added 27 regression cases and refreshed the component index and six starter projects. The missing test docstrings are also covered. Validation on the merged head: 269 tests passed, 15 skipped across URL/DNS/SSRF, settings, component-index/code-hash, and starter-project suites. Pre-commit hooks passed. Independent review found no remaining actionable issues. |
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Reviewed the updated bounded reader and merge resolution at 0d9d55e. The decompression findings are fixed, the generated components are consistent with the latest release branch, and local validation passed 269 tests with 15 skips. No remaining actionable findings from my review.
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The LFX Python 3.14 failure was Added both names to |
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Frontend Unit Test Coverage ReportCoverage Summary
Unit Test Results
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2 participants
Summary
Fixes a denial of service through memory exhaustion in the URL component (GHSA-qvqp-mxh4-f27w, CWE-400 / CWE-770).
Root cause:
URLComponentfetched pages withclient.get(...)and readresponse.text. httpx buffers the whole body before returning, and nothing checked its size.urlssupports tool mode, so when the component is an Agent tool, the URL comes from chat input: "Help me download http://attacker.example/big.html" is enough. The SSRF hardening (#11996, #13488, #13572, #15171) blocks internal addresses but does not limit size, so any public host can still trigger this with protection on (the default).I found four ways to exhaust memory:
client.get()+response.text, then parsed up to 3× by BeautifulSoup/lxmlclient.get(follow_redirects=False)read each 3xx body. Unpinned path: httpx auto-follow callsawait response.aread()on every hopbr, zstdand decodes each network chunk with no output limit. Measured: brotli turns 329 bytes into 200 MB (~637,000:1) in one decode call, before any size check can runmax_depthup to 5: one page can link to thousands of same-domain pages, each fetched and kept in memoryChanges
All changes are in
src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data_source/url.py. No inputs, outputs or public behavior for normal pages change._read_bounded_text()streams the final response and stops atMAX_RESPONSE_BYTES(10 MiB, measured after decoding). It rejects early ifContent-Lengthis already over the limit. The text is decoded the same wayresponse.textdoes it.MAX_TOTAL_BYTES(100 MiB) is shared by all URLs and crawled pages in onefetch_url_contents()call and resets on every call. Bytes read count against it even when a body is rejected, and the crawl stops once it is spent (no DNS lookup or request for the remaining links).client.stream(...)and leaves each 3xx body unread.follow_redirectsoff), the fetch followsresponse.next_requestone hop at a time. That is the request httpx itself builds when auto-following, so cookies, header stripping, method handling and the 20-redirect cap (TooManyRedirects) stay the same, just withoutaread()on each hop.Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateas a client default, so a user-supplied header still wins. Responses usingbr,zstdor stacked codings (e.g.gzip, gzip) are rejected. gzip/deflate expand at most ~1000× per 64 KiB network chunk.httpx.HTTPError, so they go through the existing error handling: withcontinue_on_failurethe page is skipped with a warning, otherwise the fetch fails withError loading documents ....timeoutis left as is on purpose. With bodies capped, a long timeout no longer turns into memory use, and httpx timeouts apply per network operation, so clamping the value would not limit total duration anyway.Regenerated artifacts:
component_index.json(make build_component_index) and the six starter projects that embed the component (scripts/ci/update_starter_projects.py). Only the URL component'scode/code_hashand the indexsha256changed.Validation
New
TestURLComponentResponseLimitsinsrc/backend/tests/unit/components/data_source/test_url_component.py. The tests fake the network at the connection level (httpcore mock streams, same pattern astest_dns_rebinding.py), so the real httpx streaming, decoding and redirect code runs. Where relevant they cover both the pinned and unpinned paths:Content-Lengthstops streaming right after the limit;gzip, deflateis advertised;br,zstdandgzip, gzipare rejected;Against the current
maincode, 12 of the 13 new tests fail. The one that passes is the httpx-behavior regression test, which is supposed to pass before and after. All 13 pass with the fix.Existing suites pass on
release-1.13.0:tests/unit/components/data_source/,test_split_text_component,test_code_hash,test_build_component_index,test_initial_setupandinitial_setup/(430 passed; the only failures are intest_s3_uploader_component, which fail the same way onrelease-1.13.0without this change, withNoCredentialsError/Unsupported S3 upload input: NoneType), and the lfxtest_component_index+data_source+test_ssrf_httpx(60 passed). Ruff and the commit hooks pass.End-to-end against a real local HTTP server (SSRF protection off so
127.0.0.1is reachable,timeout=10000000), peak RSS before → after the fetch:main)Notes
max_depth(now also by the byte budget). Per-connection read timeouts are unchanged.release-1.13.0.url.pyis identical onmain, so the same commit can be forward-ported (onlycomponent_index.jsonneeds regenerating).