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Enforce Process Isolation for Autonomous Agent Execution #423
I noticed a potential weakness in how ARTEX handles agent process isolation.
The project attempts to run agent processes under a separate UID/GID (10001), but server/execpriv.go documents that this requires a supported Unix platform and a root-running server.
When these requirements are not met, ARTEX can fall back to running agent processes under the server's identity unless isolation was explicitly requested.
Considering that ARTEX executes commands generated by autonomous AI agents, this is an important security consideration. Prompt injection or unintended command execution could have a much greater impact when agents inherit the server's privileges.
I'd suggest making the isolation status much more explicit and avoiding automatic fallback to a less restricted execution environment.
Expected outcome: Autonomous execution should not silently operate with weaker privileges than the operator expects, and deployments without the required isolation should clearly communicate the limitation.
Feature request: make autonomous-agent process isolation fail-closed and explicit — if agent processes cannot run under the dedicated UID/GID (10001) because the platform is unsupported or the server is not root, the system should not silently fall back to the server's own identity but should surface a clear warning or refuse to run, so operators never unknowingly execute agent-generated commands with weaker privileges than expected. Since this is a hardening proposal rather than a reproducible defect, no version or reproduction details are needed; it would help to know which deployment modes (Docker Compose, systemd, bare binary) should hard-fail versus warn, and whether a config flag should allow an explicit opt-in to unisolated execution.
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github-actions commentedon Nov 20, 2026
Feature request: make autonomous-agent process isolation fail-closed and explicit — if agent processes cannot run under the dedicated UID/GID (10001) because the platform is unsupported or the server is not root, the system should not silently fall back to the server's own identity but should surface a clear warning or refuse to run, so operators never unknowingly execute agent-generated commands with weaker privileges than expected. Since this is a hardening proposal rather than a reproducible defect, no version or reproduction details are needed; it would help to know which deployment modes (Docker Compose, systemd, bare binary) should hard-fail versus warn, and whether a config flag should allow an explicit opt-in to unisolated execution.
🤖 automated reply from the repo bot. A human maintainer reads everything. Ping me in any comment with
@artex-bot.